Introduction: On the eve of the Constitutional Convention, in April, 1787, James Madison put together a set of "Notes on the Confederacy." He set down what he saw as the problems requiring radical change in the Articles of Confederation. Among the defects he enumerated was:

6. Want of Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions and laws against internal violence: The Confederation is silent on this point, and therefore by the second article the hands of the federal authority are tied. According to Republican Theory, Right and power, being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous. According to fact and experience, a minority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for the majority: 1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one-third only may conquer the remaining two-thirds. 2. One-third of those who participate in the choice of the rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty excludes them from a right of suffrage, and who, for obvious reasons, will be more likely to join the standard of sedition than that of the established Government. 3. Where slavery exists, the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.

Shays' Rebellion of 1786 was the most recent and frightening instance of "internal violence." Massachusetts, like several other states, suffered from a shortage of currency. This left farmers and other debtors with no way of paying their debts even though many held more than enough property to meet their obligations. But they could not convert their assets into cash. This meant that creditors could foreclose on their farms and homes.

Massachusetts debtors petitioned the state legislature for relief. The legislature, however, listened to the creditors. Debtors determined to seek relief themselves. They turned to their Revolutionary heritage. In 1774 members of the Sons of Liberty had forced the courts in Worcester County to close and the judges to resign. Led by Daniel Shays, disgruntled debtors formed a militia and moved in the autumn of 1786 to close the courts. An address explaining their cause from the Hampshire County Shaysites specifies their demands. Without functioning courts, creditors could not foreclose. Pictured at right is an assembly of his troops listening to Shays outside the Springfield court.

The Congress of the Confederation authorized the raising of an army to combat the Shaysites, but the national government was unable to raise the necessary money since many states refused to meet their commitments. Massachusetts' governor James Bowdoin and other leaders in Massachusetts used their own funds to raise an army. The most important battle of the uprising was Shays' attack on the arsenal at Springfield in January 1787. The insurgents wanted the arms to use against the troops advancing from Boston under General Benjamin Lincoln. The troops defending the arsenal fired their cannons into the ranks of the advancing rebels, killing four and wounding 20.

The Shaysites retreated, pursued by Lincoln's soldiers. Shays fled to Vermont, which was not yet part of the union, and which refused Massachusetts' appeal for extradition. So ended "Shays' Rebellion." Courts reopened. The state legislature passed debtor relief laws The only casualties were those suffered by the Shaysites in the attack on the arsenal. Yet the overall impact of the "Rebellion" was vast since it helped convince a group of key figures to propose a complete reorganization of the Articles of Confederation.

George Washington summed up the reactions of many in a letter to James Madison:

How melancholy is the reflection, that in so short a space, we should have made such large strides towards fulfilling the prediction of our transatlantic foe! "Leave them to themselves, and their government will soon dissolve." Will not the wise and good strive hard to avert this evil? Or will their supineness suffer ignorance, and the arts of self-interested designing, disaffected and desperate characters, to involve this rising empire in wretchedness and contempt. What stronger evidence can be given of the want of energy in our governments than these disorders. If there exists not a power to check them, what security has a man for life, liberty, or property? To you, I am sure I need not add aught on this subject, the consequences of a lax, or inefficient government, are too obvious to be dwelt on. Thirteen Sovereignties pulling against each other, and all tugging at the federal head will soon bring ruin on the whole; whereas a liberal, and energetic Constitution, well guarded and closely watched, to prevent incroachments, might restore us to that degree of respectability and consequence, to which we had a fair claim, and the brightest prospect of attaining. -- Washington to James Madison, November 5, 1786

"If men were angels," Madison famously observed in Federalist #51, there would be no need for government. We need government to control human weaknesses, but government is composed of ordinary and unsanctified people. How, Madison asked, can a government strong enough to restrain its citizens be obliged to restrain itself? Doubts that it could animated the opposition to the new Constitution. How did federalists win the contest over ratification?

Chronology:

March 1, 1781: Adoption of the Articles of Confederation

1783: Treaty of Paris ends the War of Independence

1786-87: Shays' Rebellion

May 25 - September 17, 1787: Constitutional Convention meets in Philadelphia

December, 1787: Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey ratify the new Constitution as the debate heats up.

February 6-7, 1788: Massachusetts becomes the sixth state to ratify and the first to propose amendments

June 1788: New Hampshire becomes the ninth state to ratify; Virginia also ratifies but echoes the call for amendments

March 4, 1789: George Washington is inaugurated as first president under the new Constitution

June 8, 1789: James Madison introduces the Bill of Rights

[Note: We could insert a map here with a rollover to show the ratification process. As the user moves along a timeline at the bottom of the map states which had ratified could change color to green and the one that rejected (North Carolina) that rejected the Constitution could turn red. Here are the dates: Dec. 9, 1787 -- Delaware ratifies; Dec. 12, 1787 -- Pennsylvania ratifies; December 18, 1787 -- New Jersey ratifies; Jan. 2, 1788 -- Georgia ratifies; Jan. 9, 1788 -- Connecticut ratifies; Feb. 6, 1788 -- Massachusetts ratifies; Apr. 26, 1788 -- Maryland ratifies; May 23, 1788 -- South Carolina ratifies; June 21, 1788 -- New Hampshire ratifies (ninth state, number needed for adoption); June 25, 1788 -- Virginia ratifies; July 26, 1788 -- New York ratifies; August 4, 1788 -- North Carolina rejects; November 21, 1789 -- North Carolina ratifies; May 29, 1790 -- Rhode Island ratifies. Vermont remained outside the union as it had stayed outside the Articles of Confederation; it would remain white on the map.]

Benjamin Franklin opened the campaign for ratification, a process which would require the people of each state to elect a convention to consider the proposed Constitution, with a speech at the end of the Philadelphia Convention. Franklin, the oldest delegate, called upon his colleagues to present a united front to their constituents:

. . . Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all its faults, -- if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of government but what may be a blessing to the people, if well administered; and I believe, farther, that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too, whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution; for, when you assemble a number of men, to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear, that our councils are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel, and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. . . . If every one of us, in returning to our Constituents, were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain Partisans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects and great advantages resulting naturally in our favour among foreign nations, as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity. . . .

On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish, that every member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, would with me on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and, to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this Instrument.

Historians and political scientists have focused upon The Federalist Papers written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. This makes perfect sense, given Madison's leading role in the Philadelphia Convention and his subsequent authorship of the Bill of Rights. Certainly The Federalist Papers provided the most cogent and thorough defense of the new Constitution. But, the Papers aimed to influence the decision in New York, and the battle for ratification was already over by the time New York's convention met. By then, ten states, including Massachusetts and Virginia, had already approved. As a result, even though a majority of the New York delegates opposed the Constitution, the debate in its convention turned not upon the merits or demerits of the new constitution but upon the dubious wisdom of New York not joining the new union.

Although Delaware was the first state to ratify, the first battleground between proponents and opponents of the new Constitution was in Pennsylvania. The most influential voice in favor was James Wilson who had been a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention. Wilson followed Franklin's advice to present the Constitution as the best arrangement possible at the time. The most influential voice in opposition was Samuel Bryan, writing under the name "Centinel." He sounded what would be the classic anti-federalist argument: The Philadelphia Convention was a power grab.

James Wilson, Speech in favor

. . . . It will be proper . . . to mark the leading discrimination between the State constitutions and the constitution of the United States. When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate governments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question respecting the jurisdiction of the House of Assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional power is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in the instrument of the union. Hence, it is evident, that in the former case everything which is not reserved is given; but in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given is reserved.

This distinction being recognized, will furnish an answer to those who think the omission of a bill of rights a defect in the proposed constitution; for it would have been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges of which we are not divested, either by the intention or the act that has brought the body into existence. For instance, the liberty of the press, which has been a copious source of declamation and opposition -- what control can proceed from the Federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom? If, indeed, a power similar to that which has been granted for the regulation of commerce had been granted to regulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, as that the impost should be general in its operation.

Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reasons than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal Senate. This body branches into two characters, the one legislative and the other executive. In its legislative character it can effect no purpose, without the co-operation of the House of Representatives, and in its executive character it can accomplish no object without the concurrence of the President. Thus fettered I do not know any act which the Senate can of itself perform, and such dependence necessarily precludes every idea of influence and superiority. But I will confess that in the organization of this body a compromise between contending interests is descernible; and when we reflect how various are the laws, commerce, habits, population and extent of the confederated States, this evidence of mutual concession and accommodation ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite jealousy and reproach. For my part, my admiration can only be equalled by my astonishment in beholding so perfect a system formed from such heterogeneous materials.

. . . .

After all, my fellow-citizens, it is neither extraordinary or unexpected that the constitution offered to your consideration should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to pursue his own interest in preference to the public good, and I do not mean to make any personal reflection when I add that it is the interest of a very numerous, powerful and respectable body to counteract and destroy the excellent work produced by the late convention. All the officers of government and all the appointments for the administration of justice and the collection of the public revenue which are transferred from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will necessarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel. Every person, therefore, who enjoys or expects to enjoy a place of profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed innovation; not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of his country, but because it affects his schemes of wealth and consequence.

This constitution, it has been further urged, is of a pernicious tendency, because it tolerates a standing army in the time of peace. This has always been a topic of popular declamation; and yet I do not know a nation in the world which has not found it necessary and useful to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquility. Nor is it a novelty with us; for under the present articles of confederation, Congress certainly possesses this reprobated power, and the exercise of that power is proved at this moment by her cantonments along the banks of the Ohio. But what would be our national situation were it otherwise? Every principle of policy must be subverted, and the government must declare war, before they are prepared to carry it on. Whatever may be the provocation, however important the object in view, and however necessary dispatch and secrecy may be, still the declaration must precede the preparation, and the enemy will be informed of your intention, not only before you are equipped for an attack, but even before you are fortified for a defence. The consequence is too obvious to require any further delineation, and no man who regards the dignity and safety of his country can deny the necessity of a military force, under the control and with the restrictions which the new constitution provides.

The next accusation I shall consider is that which represents the federal constitution, as not only calculated, but designedly framed, to reduce the State governments to mere corporations and eventually to annihilate them. Those who have employed the term corporation upon this occasion are not perhaps aware of its extent. In common parlance, indeed, it is generally applied to petty associations for the ease and convenience of a few individuals; but in its enlarged sense, it will comprehend the government of Pennsylvania, the existing union of the States, and even this projected system is nothing more than a formal act of incorporation. But upon what presence can it be alleged that it was designed to annihilate the State governments? For I will undertake to prove that upon their existence depends the existence of the Federal plan. For this purpose, permit me to call your attention to the manner in which the President, Senate and House of Representatives are proposed to be appointed. The President is to be chosen by electors, nominated in such manner as the legislature of each State may direct; so that if there is no legislature there can be no electors, and consequently the office of President cannot be supplied.

The Senate is to be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature; and, therefore, if there is no Legislature, there can be no Senate.

Samuel Bryan, writing as "Centinel"

Permit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the constitution of this commonwealth, and to beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government submitted to your consideration, before you surrender these great and valuable privileges up forever. Your present frame of government, secures to you a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further provides "that in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." It also provides and declares. "that the people have a right of FREEDOM OF SPEECH, and of WRITING and PUBLISHING their sentiments, therefore THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED. " The constitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as yet you have the right to freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments. How long those rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine. Whether the trial by jury is to continue as your birth-right, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to declare.

Without presuming upon my own judgement, I cannot think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my private opinion, and call upon others for their's, and if I use my pen with the boldness of a freeman, it is because I know that the liberty of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges.

The late revolution having effaced in a great measure all former habits, and the present institutions are so recent, that there exists not that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities, and which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot foresee the full operation of material changes-on civil polity; it is the genius of the common law to resist innovation.

The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, have availed themselves, very successfully, of this favorable disposition; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments, have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government; all the distresses and difficulties they experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government, and in the other event, immediately ruin and annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in whom America has the highest confidence [Benjamin Franklin and George Washington], and now triumphantly exult in the completion of their long meditated schemes of power and aggrandisement. I would be very far from insinuating that the two illustrious personages alluded to, have not the welfare of their country at heart, but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one, has been imposed on, in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness and indecision attendant on old age, has been practiced on in the other.

It will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government, and that all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim, that legislation necessarily follows the power of taxation. By sect. 8, of the first article of the proposed plan of government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Now what can be more comprehensive than these words; not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive powers of a confederation, and a STANDING ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the absolute control over the commerce of the United States and all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, etc._they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation;_whatever taxes, duties and excises that they may deem requisite for the general welfare, may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Congress, distributed through every district in America; and the collection would be enforced by the standing army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every object of revenue.

To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and judicatories out of all doubt, the 6th article ordains that "this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be thesupreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

By these sections the all-prevailing power of taxation, and such extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the general government, as must in their operation, necessarily absorb the state legislatures and judicatories; and that such was in the contemplation of the framers of it, will appear from the provision made for such event, in another part of it; (but that, fearful of alarming the people by so great an innovation, they have suffered the forms of the separate governments to remain, as a blind.) By sect. 4th of the 1st article, "the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of chusing senators." The plain construction of which is, that when the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation this government, then Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and senators.

Stop and Consider:

Underlying the arguments over specific provisions of the new Constitution was a broad disagreement about the nature of government. Madison and the other "framers," as the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention came to be called, held to the arguments put forward by John Adams in his Defense of the Constitutions of the United States. Adams reviewed the histories of scores of countries to make the argument that the key to securing liberty was "balance." This was a common notion among Enlightenment thinkers, such as Voltaire, who pointed to Great Britain as the great example. Americans, led by Adams, had moved away from "balance" to "consent." [See The Stamp Act Crisis; create link here to that WC] Colonists had asserted the primacy of directly elected legislatures. In the Defense Adams returned to arguments based upon the British model. The British government balanced monarchy, aristocracy (in the House of Lords) and "commons." It balanced, that is, social orders. In the United States there was no monarch and no aristocracy. An American "balance" would require a different basis. This Adams found in the functions of government. The executive branch would balance the legislative even as the legislative limited the executive. Further, since John Locke had taught all that the legislative power would always predominate, because it alone could raise taxes and appropriate money, it was necessary to balance the legislative power against itself. Hence the bicameral legislature. Hence the different terms of office. Hence the different methods of election for House and Senate.

Bryan and many other anti-federalists explicitly rejected Adams' ideas. He and they held to the revolutionary idea that the best protection for liberty lay in the predominance of a legislature directly elected by the people. Pennsylvania's state constitution, written by Franklin, was their ideal. It alone of all the states had an one-house legislature. Here is Bryan's commentary on Adams:

I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams's sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers, whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he indeed says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue? not a day for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom and industry of mankind, that the scale would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, for want of that perfect equallity of power and distinction of interests, in the three orders of government, they exist but in name; the only operative and efficient check, upon the conduct of administration, is the sense of the people at large.

Suppose a government could be formed and supported on such principles, would it answer the great purposes of civil society; if the administrators of every government are actuated by views of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?

Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole, we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds those entrusted with power, in the greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for freemen. A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided; in such a government the people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy or despotism will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on. If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct, some will impute it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power in one body of men (separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility for then, whenever the people feel a grievance they cannot mistake the authors, and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature, and will the best secure the rights of the people.

A key point made by Bryan was that "a republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided." James Madison, like John Adams, rejected both the notion that republics rested upon "virtue" and that republics required a relatively homogeneous society. ". . . what is government itself," Madison asked in Federalist Number 51, " but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." He was willing to concede some merit to the anti-federalist position. "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government." However, "experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." Why were auxiliary precautions necessary? Madison's famous answer in Federalist Number 10 was "faction." By faction he meant "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Bryan's hoped-for republic of similarly situated citizens was, Madison thought, a will-o-the-wisp. He wrote in Number 10:

As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

Men were fallible. Franklin had joked in the Convention that the only truly infallible person he had ever heard of was an elderly French woman who, involved in an argument with her sister proclaimed: "But I meet with nobody but myself that is always in the right." Further, Madison noted, our passions and our opinions "have a reciprocal influence. . . ." Further, men have different interests. Some are creditors, some debtors -- a clear reference to Shays' Rebellion. Some are manufacturers, some are merchants, others farmers. Factions arise to advance these partial interests. From this Madison concluded:

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures, are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

Faction was productive of the greatest evils, Madison argued. And it meant that anti-federalist hymns to direct democracy were examples of wishful thinking. If republics depended upon virtue, if citizens had to put the interests of the whole ahead of their own partial interests, Madison argued, all was lost. What then was the solution? It was "balance." Madison wrote in Number 51: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?"

Summary: The debate over the Constitution pitted strongly contrasting philosophies of government against each other. Anti-federalists hewed to the Revolutionary doctrine of the supremacy of the popularly elected legislature. Federalists reverted to the pre-revolutionary notion that the key to liberty was "balance." The key to "balance," according to Madison was to so contrive the mechanism of government that competing factions would guard against each others' ambitions.

Reflect and Respond:

In article first, section first, of the new plan, it is declared that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate" -- very right, quite agreeable to nature and House of Representatives. . . .This is a palpable compliance with the humors and corrupt practices of the times. But what follows in section 2 is still worse: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states." This is a most dangerous power, and must soon produce fatal and pernicious consequences, were it not circumscribed and poised by proper checks and balances. But in this is displayed the unparalleled sagacity of the august [Philadelphia] convention: that when such bulwarks of prejudice surrounded the evil, so as to render it both difficult and dangerous to attack it by assault and storm, they have invested and barricaded it so closely as will certainly deprive it of its baneful influence and prevent its usual encroachments. They have likewise stationed their miners and sappers so judiciously, that they will certainly, in process of time, entirely reduce and demolish this obnoxious practice of popular election. There is a small thrust given to it in the body of the conveyance itself. The term of holding elections is every two years; this is much better than the detestable mode of annual elections, so fatal to energy.

How did Madison answer in Federalist 51?